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Abstract 
 This study examines the influence of investment bank’s reputation 
and political connection on the IPO qualification of Chinese firms. The 
results show that firms which are sponsored by prestigious investment banks 
are more likely to pass the regular screening process. Also, the investment 
bank’s political connections have no significant impact on the IPO 
qualification. Furthermore, we compared the various investment banks’ 
customer’s characteristic. Thus, the results show that the customers of 
prestigious investment banks have more large-scale, are high growth 
companies, and are more central enterprises. This indicates that high 
reputation investment banks tend to choose low risk and high growth 
prospective IPO companies in order to avoid damage to the reputation. 
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Introduction 
 How do we avoid the lemons firms in the capital market? China's 
capital market has two thresholds. One is the certification of investment 
bank, while the other was approved by the China Securities Regulatory 
Commission (CSRC). However, this commission operates under the 
authority of the State Council. There is a principal-agent relationship 
between investment banking and supervision department, which is similar to 
the investors. To ensure that the company recommended by the investment 
bank is a good company, China securities regulatory authorities introduced 
the sponsor system form ATM market in the UK and the Hong Kong market. 
Investment banks have sponsor qualification. They are responsible for 
recommending the listed companies. Also, they continue to monitor the 
company’s disclosure behavior listed within two years. Thus, if any violation 
occurs, the sponsor must bear some responsibility. Also, the sponsor will be 
punished by the regulatory authorities. As a result, investment banks are 
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highly motivated to carry out checks on the quality of the enterprise, in order 
to maintain its reputation 
 Whether an investment bank can choose a qualified enterprise is 
dependent on its ability and independence. High reputation investment banks 
usually have more professional research teams. They are more likely to hire 
high-quality auditors and to find potential problems in the enterprise. On the 
other hand, high reputation investment banks usually have more customers. 
Also, the impact of a single customer on its business is weak, and it is more 
likely to maintain a high level of independence. Therefore, high reputation 
investment banks are more likely to have a rigorous examination of the 
quality of the enterprise. As a result, this leads to the enhancement of the 
possibility of its customers through approval. In addition to strict standards 
to improve the audit pass rate, investment banks may also establish 
relationships with the government to enable its customers to receive 
preferential treatment of the audit institutions. Thus, this helps in improving 
the audit by the interest rate. Yang (2013) shows that firms whose auditor 
have political relationship are more likely to pass the IPO approval. 
Therefore, the question of this paper shows: 1) whether the investment 
bank's reputation can affect its customer IPO qualifications? 2) whether the 
investment bank's political relationship can affect its customer’s IPO 
qualifications? 
 Consequently, this paper has two major contributions. First, the 
previous research on the reputation of investment banks mainly focused on 
the degree of earnings management before the listing, the first day 
underpricing rate, and the long-term rate of return. This paper considers 
whether the reputation can reduce the information asymmetry between the 
investment bank and the supervision department. Additionally, it also aims at 
improving the possibility of the customer to obtain the approval of the 
government. This was done from the perspective of the relationship between 
investment banks and government agency. Second, the previous studies on 
the economic consequences of political relations are mainly focused on the 
enterprise. Thus, there is less literature on the political relationship between 
financial intermediaries. Yang (2013) studied the value of the auditor's 
political relationship. Furthermore, this paper examines the economic 
consequences of the investment bank’s political relationship. 
 
Related Literature 
 Carter & Manaster (1990) show that there is significant negative 
relationship between underwriter reputation and IPO initial returns. 
Therefore, high reputation underwriters can significantly reduce the 
information asymmetry between the issuer and investors. In addition, it also 
reduces the cost of the capital of issuers. Michaely & Shaw (1994) study also 
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show that the higher the underwriter reputation, the lower the first day return 
of its underwriting project. Thus, the long-term rate of return is higher. 
Carter et al. (1998) show that underwriter reputation and post IPO long-term 
return has a significant positive correlation. The underwriter reputation is 
high, and the post IPO long-run return is higher. Furthermore, they opine that 
the underwriter reputation and the first day return have a significant negative 
correlation. Therefore, the underwriter reputation is high, and the IPO 
underpricing rate is low.  
 Fernando et al. (2005) shows that issuers and the underwriters 
associate by mutual choice. However, large-scale and high quality issuers are 
more likely to choose more prestigious underwriters. Jo et al. (2007) 
examines the association between the choice of investment bank and earning 
management. Hence, the results show that there is an inverse association 
between underwriter quality and earning management. Underwriter quality is 
positively related to SEOs’ post-issue performance. Agrawal & Coorper 
(2010) show that the probability of restatement by an initial public offering 
(IPO) firm is positively related to the reputation of the underwriter. The 
results suggest that underwriters’ concerns about revenue generation 
outweigh their concerns about reputation. Chang et al. (2010) show that IPO 
firms, with more prestigious underwriters, are likely to exhibit substantially 
less-aggressive earnings management. This indicates that prestigious 
underwriters will carefully monitor and certify financial information on IPO 
firms. Thus, this can be done by limiting any potential earnings manipulation 
to protect their reputation. 
 Su & Bangassa (2011) examines the effect of underwriter reputation 
on IPO first day return and post IPO long-term return in China as a share 
market. The results show that there was no significant relationship between 
underwriter reputation and IPO initial return. Nevertheless, the underwriter 
reputations have a significant positive impact on the post IPO long-term 
return. By using Chinese IPO firms as a sample, Chen et al. (2013) examines 
the relationship between the underwriter reputation and pre-IPO earnings 
management behavior. They discovered that compared to state-owned 
holding companies, underwriter reputation have a negative significant effect 
on the non-state-owned company’s pre-IPO earnings management. 
 Consequently, by using Chinese companies as a sample, Francis et al. 
(2009) examines the effect of political relation on the firm’s listing 
characteristic. The results show that political related firms have a higher PE 
ratio. Also, the underpricing rate is lower, while political connections can 
help enterprise to obtain more funds through IPO. They are also used in 
examining the effect of the underwriter’s political relations, and to find firms 
whose underwriter have political connection with a higher PE ratio always. 
Furthermore, the first day return is always lower. Yang (2013) studied the 
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effect of political relations of auditor business. Therefore, the results show 
that political related audit firms have higher market share, higher audit fees, 
and more customers through the IPO Audit Commission.  
 
Methodology  
 Table 1 details our sample selection procedures for IPO application 
firms. We limit our sample to 2004-2015 because from the beginning of 
2004, China started the implementation of the sponsor system. As a result, 
we have 1757 prospective IPO companies, of which 1523 companies pass 
the IPO screening process. On the other hand, 234 companies did not get 
through. The data of this paper comes from WIND. 
Table 1. Sample Selection Procedures 
 total 
Initial sample of IPO application firms over the period 2004-2015  1892 
Exclude firms in the financial industry 28 
Exclude firms with missing data 107 
Final sample 1757 
Pass 1523（86.7%） 
Not pass 2，34（13.3%） 
 
 To determine whether investment bank’s reputation improve the 
possibility of IPO approval for their clients, the following logistic models 
were estimated.  
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 REPU is underwriter reputation variables. If in year t-1, investment 
bank’s IPO business market share ranked in the top ten, then the variable is 
equal to 1. Otherwise, it is equal to 0. Furthermore, if the estimated 
coefficient of the variable is significantly positive, this indicates that IPO 
application firm which is recommended by high reputation investment banks 
is more likely to pass the screening process. 
 CENTR_UW, which is an investment bank, is defined to be central 
government-controlled if the immediate largest shareholder of the investment 
bank is the Ministry of Finance or the State-owned Assets Supervision and 
Administration Commission (SASAC). China's financial market is highly 
regulated by the central government. As a result, we adopted the central 
government holding company as an alternative to the political relationship. If 
the estimated coefficient of this variable is significantly positive, this 
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indicates that the investment bank's political relationship can improve the 
probability of obtaining the listing qualification for their clients. Table 2 is 
the specific definition of other control variables. 
Table 2. Variable definitions 
Prob 
(approve=1)  
The variable is equal to 1 if the firm passes the screening process; 
otherwise, it is equal to 0. 
REPU_UWi,t 
The variable is equal to 1 if investment bank’s IPO business market share 
ranked in the top ten in year t-1; otherwise, it is equal to 0. 
CENTR_UWi,t 
The variable is equal to 1 if the investment bank’s largest shareholder is 
the Ministry of Finance or the State-owned Assets Supervision and 
Administration Commission (SASAC); otherwise, it is equal to 0. 
OPROAi,t-1 Annual operating income divided by the average total assets in year t-1. 
LEVi,t-1 Total debts divided by total assets in year t-1. 
SIZEi,t-1 Natural logarithm of total assets in year t-1.  
GROWTHi,t-1 The annual sales growth rate in year t-1 
INTANi,t-1 Intangible assets divided by total assets in year t-1 
CENTRi,t-1 
The variable is equal to 1 if the firm is controlled by the central 
government.  
MULAPPi,t 
The variable is equal to 1 if the company has applied IPO before; 
otherwise, it is equal to 0. 
MKTRETi,t 
Cumulative rate of return on the Shanghai Composite Index for the year 
before the company's Application. 
GEMi,t 
The variable is equal to 1 if the company applies for listing on the GEM; 
otherwise, it is equal to 0. 
SMBi,t 
The variable is equal to 1 if the company is listed on the SME board 
market; otherwise, it is equal to 0 
YEAR Year dummy variable 
INDU Industry dummy variable  
 
 Table 3 reports the descriptive statistics of the variables for both 
firms which passed the CSRC’s screening process and firms that do not pass. 
Thus, it can be seen that out of 1757 of the samples, 87% of the sample pass 
the CSRC’s screening process, and 13% of the companies did not pass. 45% 
of the approved company hired a high reputable investment bank as a 
sponsor. In the companies that do not pass the screening process, only 37% 
of the company hired a high-reputation investment bank. Thus, this 
difference is significant. There is no significant difference in the types of 
ultimate controlling shareholder of investment bank. The size of approved 
companies is significantly greater than the companies not approved. 
Nevertheless, the growth rate of the approved company is lower than the 
company that is not approved. Table 4 reports the correlation coefficients. 
The investment bank's reputation is positively related to the size and growth 
of the enterprise. Also, central government controlled companies are more 
likely to choose a high-reputation underwriter. 
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Table 3. Descriptive statistics 
 pass(1523) not pass(234)   
Variable mean p50 mean p50 T Z 
REPU_UW 0.45 0.00 0.37 0.00 2.42** 2.42** 
CENTR_UW 0.22 0.00 0.20 0.00 0.91 0.91 
OPROA 0.15 0.13 0.15 0.13 0.13 0.21 
SIZE 20.28 20.06 19.97 19.82 4.01*** 3.80*** 
GROWTH 1.28 1.21 1.32 1.25 1.63 1.93* 
LEV 0.45 0.45 0.46 0.45 0.80 0.86 
INTAN 0.05 0.04 0.05 0.04 0.31 0.52 
CENTR 0.06 0.00 0.02 0.00 2.19** 2.19** 
MULAPP 0.07 0.00 0.03 0.00 2.42** 2.42** 
MKTRET 16.68 7.64 8.82 -3.74 3.21*** 3.44*** 
GEM 0.34 0.00 0.32 0.00 0.57 0.57 
SMB 0.49 0.00 0.54 1.00 1.54 1.54 
 
Regression Results 
 Table 5 reports the regression results of the model (1). The estimated 
coefficient of REPU_UW is 0.416, which is significant at the 1% level. 
However, this indicates that firms which were recommended by high-
reputation investment banks are more likely to pass the audit. The estimated 
coefficient of CENTR_UW is 0.078. Nevertheless, they are not significant. 
This indicates that the type of ultimate controlling shareholder of the 
investment bank has no significant impact on the enterprise audit pass rate.  
 The estimated coefficient of OPROA is 3.004. It is significant at the 
10% level, and the estimated coefficient of size is 0.738. Therefore, this 
shows that large and profitable enterprises are more likely to pass the audit. 
The estimated coefficient of MULAPP is 1.2. It is significant at the 1% level, 
and indicates that the re-application is more likely to pass the audit. The 
estimated coefficient of GEM and SMB are significantly positive. This 
indicates that compared to the main board market, the IPO audit pass rate is 
higher in GEM and in small and medium enterprises board market. 
 Table 6 reports the characteristics of prospective IPO companies 
sponsored by different reputation investment banks. Also, we divided the 
companies into two groups: one group is sponsored by the high reputation 
investment bank, while the other group is sponsored by low reputation 
investment bank. Then, we compared the financial performance differences 
between the two groups. We found that, compared to the companies 
sponsored by the low reputation investment banking, companies sponsored 
by high reputation investment are significantly higher in the scale and 
growth. In addition, there are more central enterprises recommended by high 
reputation investment banks. Therefore, considering their own interests, high 
reputation investment banks tend to choose low-risk and highly profitable 
business. Nevertheless, these companies are more likely to pass the CSRC’s 
screening process. 
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Table 4. Correlation   
 
Table 5. Regression results 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Approve approve approve 
REPU_UW 0.504***  0.416*** 
 (3.34)  (3.01) 
CENTR_UW  0.132 0.078 
  (0.72) (0.36) 
OPROA   3.004* 
   (1.75) 
LEV   -1.223 
   (-1.38) 
SIZE   0.738*** 
   (5.23) 
GROWTH   -0.039 
   (-0.13) 
INTAN   0.294 
   (0.19) 
CENTR   0.598 
   (1.10) 
MULAPP   1.200*** 
   (2.97) 
MKTRET   0.003 
   (1.26) 
GEM   1.442*** 
   (4.85) 
SMB   1.024*** 
   (4.23) 
_cons 0.138 0.434 -14.985*** 
 (0.15) (0.47) (-5.08) 
N 1717 1717 1717 
pseudo R2 0.062 0.054 0.104 
t statistics in parentheses, * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Table 6. The characteristics of prospective IPO companies 
 REPU_UW=1(774) REPU_UW=0(983)   
Variable Mean p50 mean p50 T Z 
OPROA 0.151 0.136 0.145 0.131 1.62 1.59 
SIZE 20.350 20.091 20.145 19.993 3.94*** 3.53*** 
GROWTH 1.311 1.236 1.274 1.202 2.27** 2.34** 
LEV 0.451 0.447 0.460 0.457 1.19 1.2 
INTAN 0.051 0.041 0.052 0.044 0.17 0.22 
CENTR 0.061 0.000 0.043 0.000 1.71* 1.71* 
 
Conclusion 
 This paper examines the influence of investment bank’s reputation 
and political connection on their clients’ IPO qualification. The results show 
that firms which are sponsored by prestigious investment banks are more 
easily approved by the government. Also, the investment bank’s political 
connections have no significant impact on the IPO qualification. 
Furthermore, we compared the investment bank's customer characteristic, 
and find that High reputation investment bank’s customers have more large-
scale, are high growth companies, and are more central enterprises. This 
indicates that high reputation investment bank tends to choose low risk and 
high growth prospective IPO companies in order to avoid damage to 
reputation. 
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